An appeal about what competent service means

This digest relates to cases published by the respective regulators during week ending 28 August 2026 which have sufficient detail to allow us to comment.

The practitioner acted as executrix in the administration of an estate. An SRA adjudicator found that she had failed to provide a competent service, in breach of paragraph 3.2 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Solicitors, RELs and RFLs, and the earlier Outcome 1.5 of the SRA Code of Conduct 2011, having failed to progress the administration in a timely manner and to respond adequately to communications. The testatrix died in February 2019, probate was not granted until August 2024, and distribution was still incomplete when the decision was made. She was rebuked, publication of the rebuke was ordered, and costs of £1,350 awarded.

The dominant theme of the appeal was on proportionality. Counsel accepted that the absence of dishonesty did not itself make a rebuke impermissible, but argued that no breach of Principles 2 or 6 had been found, that what remained were competence and service failings, and that a warning was proportionate. He relied on external difficulties: a death abroad, delays in obtaining documentation, the pandemic, and obligations as executrix to report accurately to HMRC.

The Tribunal accepted that a warning was reasonably open to a decision maker, but dismissed the appeal, because on a review the question is not what the Tribunal would have decided but whether the findings were unjustified, the evaluative assessment fell outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement, or the decision was wrong or unjust. Costs of £5,138.88 were ordered.

Competence mapping

Competence D1c requires solicitors to meet timescales, D1d to monitor progress and keep other people informed of it, and D1e to deal effectively with unforeseen circumstances. D1e answers the mitigation: a death abroad, missing documents, a pandemic and a difficult third party are unforeseen circumstances, and the competence does not treat their existence as the answer. Competence C2i requires clients to be informed in a timely way of progress towards objectives, and competence B7c requires a case to be brought to a conclusion. A beneficiary waiting five years for a grant of probate does not fit this competence framework.

The practical point is the one the appeal raised and lost. A solicitor can commit no dishonesty, take no personal benefit, have the Principles allegations rejected, and still be rebuked, named and ordered to pay costs for failing to provide a competent and timely service.

Not always his act, but always his responsibility

The Tribunal judgment in SRA v Gordon Mcpherson Keir (case number 12807) confirms that the respondent was an equity partner at Hadgkiss Hughes & Beale and, throughout the relevant period, its COFA and its COLP. The proceedings arose from an SRA forensic investigation following a series of qualified Accountant’s Reports.

Four allegations were found proved. The first was that he signed four professional indemnity insurance proposal forms which wrongly answered ‘No’ to a question asking whether the firm’s accounts had been qualified in the last five years. The regulator withdrew the allegations of dishonesty and of misleading insurers. The Tribunal found a serious lack of care, but was not persuaded that the conduct crossed the line between carelessness and a departure from the ethical standards of the profession. Lack of integrity was not proved; conduct undermining public trust was.

The second concerned residual balances. Client money remained reconciled and identifiable; the problem was that it was retained after the proper purpose for holding it had expired. There was no misappropriation, loss or personal gain, though the Tribunal assessed harm as low to moderate rather than absent. The respondent had circulated balances to fee earners and discussed the issue with the reporting accountants, but conceded that no written plan existed and that compliance was not adequately monitored or recorded. His responsibilities as COFA required more than that. The third and fourth allegations were the late delivery of two Accountant’s Reports without the regulator’s approval of the extension, and a payment of residual balances to charity without prior authorisation.

The charity payment separates the two kinds of fault. The payment had been authorised by another partner, and the personal breach was not proved because the Tribunal was not satisfied he had any direct involvement in or prior knowledge of the decision. What was proved was the firm level failure of governance, systems and controls. Responsibility as COFA for the firm’s procedures remained his regardless.

The solicitor was reprimanded, restricted from acting as COFA for a minimum of 12 months, and required to complete an SRA approved COFA training course before taking the role again. Costs were reduced from the £43,795.36 sought to £39,000. He had an unblemished record over more than 40 years.

Competence mapping

Competence D3c requires solicitors to apply the rules of professional conduct to accounting and financial matters, and competence D3a requires an adequate understanding of the financial and organisational context in which they work and of their role in it. The Tribunal’s central finding is that the respondent understood the problem and never converted the understanding into a system. Competence D1d requires progress to be monitored and other people kept informed of it, and competence D2 requires records which are accurate, complete and clear. A monitoring exercise which is never written down cannot afterwards be relied on by anybody, including the person who carried it out. Competence C3c requires the work of others to be supervised effectively and competence C3g requires expectations to be clear. Circulating a list of old balances to fee earners is delegation. What the Tribunal found missing was everything which should follow it.

The shape of the outcome is worth noticing. Dishonesty was withdrawn, integrity was not proved, and the sanction was a reprimand, a year out of the COFA role and training before returning to it. That is a remediation shaped disposal, and the profession does not see that shape in action as often as it should.

A letter that could not be found, and two that were made up

The Tribunal’s judgment in SRA v Syed Suhail Abbas Sibtain (case number 12855) was dealt with on the papers by way of agreed outcome. The respondent was employed as a solicitor at Thursfields Solicitors. The solicitors acting for the claimant telephoned the practitioner to say they had not received an acknowledgement of service. He told them he had prepared it in July and emailed them a letter dated 24 July 2023. They checked the document properties: it had been created six minutes after their call, and the firm could find no trace of a July letter on its systems. Asked to produce the original, the solicitor opened an unrelated pre action protocol letter created in July, overwrote it so that it contained the wording of the first letter, and sent that to the firm as the original. He maintained that account when interviewed. He later admitted to the regulator that he had created the second letter to mislead his employer, because he was afraid of losing his job. He was dismissed and reported.

The mitigation, which the regulator did not agree, is recorded in the statement of agreed facts. It states over seven years of compliant practice, billing targets he was struggling to reach, a change from hybrid working to attendance 80 miles from home, a rising caseload including files outside his normal area of law, two family bereavements, his own health deteriorating to the point of hospital treatment, and three young children with a wife who was heavily pregnant. He admitted both allegations, including dishonesty, and was struck off with costs of £5,000.

Competence mapping

Competence B7a requires solicitors to apply relevant processes and procedures so as to progress the matter effectively, and the whole sequence began with a step in litigation of which the firm’s systems held no record. It is important to add that the Tribunal judgment makes no finding as to whether or not the acknowledgement of service was ever filed.

Competence A3b requires solicitors to recognise when they have made mistakes or are experiencing difficulties and to take appropriate action, competence A3c requires them to seek guidance and support where needed, and competence C3d requires colleagues to be kept informed of risks and problems. The problem began as a document which could not be found on the firm’s systems and ended as a fabricated one. The conduct which led to the strike off was inconsistent with competences A1a to A1d, which concern ethics, honesty, professional judgment and following the rules.

Two roles, one government database

The Tribunal judgment in SRA v Md Towhidul Islam (case number 12819) confirms that the matter was resolved by agreed outcome. The respondent was admitted to the Roll in October 2020, and the conduct pre dates his admission. For three and a half months in 2019 he was employed by the Home Office as a litigation caseworker dealing with pre action protocol correspondence and judicial review claims. At the same time he was a trainee solicitor at a firm doing immigration work, representing clients in visa applications to the Home Office and in challenges to refusals. He declared the second job at the vetting stage but never raised it with his line manager or mentor once a role had been allocated so that it could be fully considered. His objectives required him to use resources only for authorised public purposes and to treat data and personal information carefully.

He accessed eight visa application files on the Home Office Central Referencing System, none of which had been allocated to him. Five concerned family members, two were his own clients at the firm where he held a training contract, and one was a live application belonging to somebody he knew, which he opened 12 times. The regulator withdrew two of the four allegations and withdrew dishonesty from the remaining two. Recklessness was admitted. The Tribunal assessed culpability as moderate to high, referring to misplaced and inappropriate curiosity about matters with which he was personally connected, and harm as high, because unauthorised access to confidential government data undermines public confidence in the handling of sensitive personal information. He was suspended from practice for 12 months, with a 12 month restriction order to follow, and ordered to pay costs of £41,350.

Competence mapping

Competence A1a requires solicitors to recognise ethical issues and to exercise effective judgment in addressing them, competence A1b to understand and apply the ethical concepts which govern their role and behaviour as a lawyer, and competence A1c to identify the relevant SRA principles and rules of professional conduct and to follow them. The objectives of his Home Office role told him what he could use the system for, none of the eight files had been allocated to him, and he opened one of them 12 times. Competence A1d requires solicitors to resist pressure to condone, ignore or commit unethical behaviour. The Statement does not say where that pressure must come from, and I read the pull here as coming from his own connection to the people whose files he opened. That is a reading of the competence, not a finding of the Tribunal. Dishonesty was withdrawn, but recklessness was admitted, and the competence question is not whether he understood the restriction but whether he applied it.

Competence D2b requires compliance with confidentiality, security, data protection and file retention and destruction requirements, and the access itself breached it. Competence C3d requires colleagues to be kept informed of progress of work, including any risks or problems, which is where the undeclared second job sits: he disclosed it at the vetting stage but never raised it with his line manager or mentor once his role had been allocated. He was a trainee at the time and not yet on the Roll, and the competences describe a standard rather than a start date.

A conference at court, and words which had nothing to do with the case

The Bar Tribunals and Adjudication Service’s report of findings and sanction in the case of Johanna Morris, case reference 2024/0700/D5, sets out a single admitted charge of professional misconduct contrary to Core Duty 5 of the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales. The barrister was instructed at court at short notice to cover a prosecution and resist a bail application. The complainant, who was from Pakistan, had made allegations of domestic violence against the defendant. In conference a trainee detective constable, concerned for her safety, said that the defendant was seeking bail on the erroneous basis that he could then help her with a visa application.

The particulars record that the barrister then said, of the complainant, words to the effect of “she only wants a visa so that she doesn’t have to go back to her little goat farm where she is from” and “yeah, a fucking little goat farmer”.

The tribunal found that the visa reference played a material part in the remarks, which appeared to reflect a provisional view that the complainant was playing the system, and that the comments were extremely rude with obvious racist themes, gratuitous and of no relevance to her instructions. The barrister initially denied the words, then accepted the officer’s evidence after seeing screenshots of messages sent to a colleague that day, saying: “I am not a racist, but I accept that I am sometimes irritable and at times I express myself in an overtly robust way without realising the impact of my words.” It treated the conduct as behaviour towards others rather than as discrimination, but found a discriminatory element arising from hostility to a person from a protected characteristic group, and weighed the seniority imbalance between counsel and a trainee officer. In mitigation it took account of her late instruction, the bail conditions she secured, testimonials giving no indication of racist tendencies and a completed eight week diversity course. She was reprimanded, fined £3,000 and ordered to pay costs of £3,810.

Competence mapping

Core Duty 5 obliges a barrister not to behave in a way likely to diminish the trust and confidence the public places in them or in the profession. Core Duty 8, which prohibits unlawful discrimination, was not charged, so this analysis runs through the Professional Statement.

Competence 3.4 requires barristers to treat all people with respect and courtesy regardless of their background or circumstances, and sub point 3.4(a) requires politeness and respect in communications and personal interactions with others. A conference with a police officer before a bail application is that kind of interaction. Competence 3.2(b) requires barristers to comprehend how their behaviour may affect others within and outside teams, and her own account, that she expresses herself robustly without realising the impact of her words, is an admission that she did not do so.

Competence 2.3 requires barristers to be aware and active in the pursuit of equality and respect for diversity, and sub point 2.3(b) requires alertness to the potential for unconscious bias. That is where the framework locates the work of preventing the discriminatory element the tribunal found, before the remark rather than after.

SRA regulatory disposals in the week ending 28 August 2026

The SRA published seven decisions. Two were referrals to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, where the allegations are unproved and I express no view. Two entries record a single intervention, into Roundhay Solicitors and into the practice of Azair Mahmood Alam, on the grounds of suspected dishonesty and failure to comply with the SRA Principles. One imposed conditions on the practising certificate of Heather Joan Roberts, among them that she may not be responsible for, or involved in, the training or supervision of any employee; the published reasons say only that the conditions are necessary in the public interest, and reasonable and proportionate.

The remaining two are orders under section 43 of the Solicitors Act 1974, which control where a person who is not a solicitor may work in a regulated practice. The first concerns Lewis Duncan, an information technology analyst at Ashurst LLP, who took a firm laptop home and did not return it. The regulator found the conduct dishonest and ordered costs of £600. The second concerns Siobhan Hall, a former employee of AJM Solicitors, who agreed to an order and costs of £300 following a conviction. The offence is not identified in the published decision, so I say nothing about it.

Neither of the last two decisions is about a solicitor’s own competence, and that is the reason for including them. Competence C3c requires solicitors to supervise the work of others effectively and competence C3g requires them to be clear about expectations. Paragraph 4.3 of the SRA Code of Conduct for Firms requires firms to ensure that their managers and employees are competent to carry out their role. That duty is owed in respect of everybody in the building, not only those holding practising certificates.

Closing thoughts

Two of this week’s judgments contain no finding of dishonesty and no finding of a lack of integrity. One concerns an estate which took more than five years to reach a grant of probate; the other highlights that a compliance officer can be sanctioned for actions which are not their own. The profession tends to treat competence as the soft end of regulation and integrity as the hard end. These two decisions do not support that.

The other two solicitor judgments concern information rather than money: a letter which could not be found and was then manufactured, and a trainee who opened files he had no business opening. In the first, a line manager was there to be told and was not told; in the second, the files were not his to open and he opened them anyway. One of this week’s SRA decisions approaches supervision from the other end, with conditions on a solicitor’s practising certificate which stop her being responsible for, or involved in, the training or supervision of any employee. Supervision is not only an expectation to be met; it is also a permission which can be withdrawn.

One of the judgments records considerable personal pressure on the practitioner, put forward in mitigation which the regulator did not accept. Where practitioners are carrying that kind of load, or dealing with the stress of an investigation or of tribunal proceedings, LawCare’s free and confidential helpline, 0800 279 6888, remains available to anyone in the legal sector.

A lesson this week’s decisions teach: a regulator does not need to find dishonesty to restrict a practitioner’s practice. Slow work, loose oversight, misplaced curiosity and a careless remark each did it this week.

Beyond Competence Limited, for information and educational purposes only. This digest does not constitute legal advice