Three SDT judgments this week

When supervision fails, when a boundary is crossed, and whether inappropriate behaviour means misconduct

This digest relates to cases published by the respective regulators during week ending 24 July 2026 which have sufficient detail to allow us to comment.

That failure led to repeated failures to comply with court orders, wasted costs orders, adjournments, the exclusion of evidence and, eventually, the striking out of the client’s claim. The Tribunal found the conduct manifestly incompetent and found that it also showed a lack of integrity, in breach of paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6 of the Code of Conduct and Principles 1, 2, 5 and 7.

Two further allegations followed from the same case. Under cross examination, the solicitor omitted to tell the court that he and the client were co-directors of more than one company and that the client was also an employee of his firm, a breach of paragraph 1.4 of the Code and Principles 1 and 2; the Tribunal accepted that this arose in difficult personal circumstances, following news of a bereavement, and did not find dishonesty on this limb. Separately, and more seriously, the Tribunal found that the solicitor knowingly gave the SRA inaccurate and misleading information about who owned and used an email account connected to the case. His successive explanations were implausible, inconsistent with the known facts and calculated to conceal the client’s connection with the firm. That conduct was found dishonest, breaching paragraph 1.4 of the Code and Principles 2, 4 and 5. The Tribunal struck the solicitor off, finding no exceptional circumstances that would make that sanction disproportionate.

Competence mapping (SRA Statement of Solicitor Competence)

The case management failings sit at competence B7, planning, managing and progressing legal cases and transactions, and specifically B7a, applying relevant processes and procedures to progress the matter effectively, and B7b, assessing, communicating and managing risk. They also engage competence C3b, supervising the work of others effectively; the judgment records that the file had been allocated to a paralegal with limited experience of small claims litigation, and that the solicitor relied on what he was told without checking the file or the court orders himself. These facts engage competence A3a, disclosing when work is beyond one’s personal capability, and A3d, knowing when to seek expert advice, too; the Tribunal recorded that the solicitor was, in his own evidence, unfamiliar with the relevant law and procedure, which is exactly the position A3 asks a solicitor to recognise and act on rather than let continue unsupervised. Competence D1f, paying appropriate attention to detail, and D1e, dealing effectively with unforeseen circumstances, sit alongside these; wasted costs orders and adjournments are usually the visible sign of both competences being lacking well before the final hearing.

Both candour failings engage competence A1a, recognising ethical issues and exercising effective judgment in addressing them, in two different directions. The omission to the court engages A1a on its own; the misleading account to the SRA engages A1a alongside A1c, identifying the relevant SRA principles and rules of professional conduct and following them, because what was owed to the regulator was a straightforward and honest answer, not a series of explanations designed to survive scrutiny. It is worth noticing how the case moved from a competence failure of poor supervision of litigation, into an integrity failure: concealment from the regulator. The Statement of Solicitor Competence describes reflecting on and learning from practice, competence A2b, as an ongoing discipline precisely because the alternative to early honest disclosure of a mistake is usually a later and much more serious integrity finding.

Is this the start of the Mazur judgment’s impact?

The facts in Ilyas arose before the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur and another v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP and others [2026] EWCA Civ 369, handed down on 31 March 2026. The Court of Appeal held that an unauthorised person, such as a paralegal, may lawfully conduct litigation, not merely support or assist with it, provided this is done under the supervision of an authorised individual who has put in place appropriate arrangements for that supervision and delegation. Ilyas is a useful illustration of what the Solicitor’s Disciplinary Tribunal considers those arrangements look like when they are absent in substance: a paralegal with limited small claims experience was allocated the file, and correspondence issued in the solicitor’s name was approved without him checking it against the file or the court orders himself. The SRA has also updated its guidance on effective supervision this year, most recently on 12 June 2026. It is worth being precise, though, about what actually drove the sanction in Ilyas. The Tribunal’s sanction reasoning centres on the dishonesty found, the misleading information given to the SRA; the judgment states that, given the finding of dishonesty, the Tribunal did not consider lesser sanctions at all, since a finding of dishonesty is almost invariably followed by strike off. The supervision failure under allegation 1.1 was itself found to lack integrity, but the judgment’s sanction reasoning treats it as part of the picture of culpability, not as the finding that made strike off inevitable on its own. Whether a supervision failure of this kind, without an accompanying dishonesty finding, would now attract the same sanction given Mazur and the new guidance, is a real question, but it is not one this judgment answers.

In SRA v Adrian Robert Berkeley (case number 12866-2025), a very different route led to the same sanction. The matter arose after the son of a vulnerable woman, detained under the Mental Health Act 1983, reported the solicitor’s conduct to the SRA. The Tribunal found that the solicitor had formed a personal connection with the woman and involved himself in her affairs, then sent her son and another relative an unsolicited email asserting that he was instructed by her, describing himself as her next of kin, telling them they had been removed from that position and should have no further involvement in her care, threatening a claim for false imprisonment and assault against them if they had been involved in a decision to have her sectioned, quoting a charging rate of £500 per hour, and stating that the woman intended to transfer her property to him (the solicitor) in place of anticipated legal costs. The Tribunal found this conduct deliberate and dishonest, and noted that the solicitor had relied on his status, providing his SRA number in the email, to lend it credibility. WhatsApp messages the solicitor later provided to the SRA suggested a personal and emotionally involved relationship with the woman. A separate allegation arose from the solicitor’s conviction, following a trial in the Magistrates’ Court, for stalking another individual and causing her serious alarm and distress, for which he received a suspended sentence. He did not engage with the Tribunal proceedings; medical evidence he relied on was found not to establish that he was unable to participate, and the hearing went ahead in his absence. Both allegations were found proved and the Tribunal struck him off.

Competence mapping (SRA Statement of Solicitor Competence)

Competence A1a, recognising ethical issues and exercising effective judgment, is engaged at the most basic level; a solicitor purporting to act for someone is not free to also become personally and emotionally involved with them, still less to use that involvement to exclude her family from her care. Competence A1c, identifying the relevant SRA principles and rules of professional conduct and following them, is engaged by the deliberate use of the solicitor’s professional status, his SRA number included, to lend credibility to a dishonest email; this is exactly the abuse of position that the rules against taking unfair advantage of others exist to prevent. Competence C2d, identifying and taking reasonable steps to meet the particular service needs of all clients including those in vulnerable circumstances, describes precisely the opposite of what happened here; a vulnerable person’s circumstances were used, not protected. And competence C2g, agreeing the services that are being provided and a clear basis for charging, is engaged by the unilateral statement of an hourly rate and the suggestion that a property would be transferred in place of costs, without anything resembling a retainer or a costs agreement behind either. A proper letter of engagement, addressing exactly what C2g asks for, would have made the charging arrangement the solicitor asserted impossible to advance in the way that he did.

A dismissal: where inappropriate behaviour stops short of misconduct

The third judgment this week, SRA v Anthony David Davis (case number 12867-2025), published on 21 July 2026, records that all six allegations against the solicitor were dismissed. Mr Davis, a solicitor since 1980, was acting as duty solicitor at a police station in August 2023 when he made a series of remarks to two female police officers during the disclosure and interview process for his client. He admitted making the comments and that they were inappropriate in the Statement of Agreed Facts but withdrew the admission that they were inappropriate at the start of the hearing. The Tribunal considered the six allegations, some individually and some were assessed together. Three, remarks about his personal life, his health and his driving history, were found not to be inappropriate or  evidenced with sufficient clarity , given the context in which they were made. The remaining three, a comment about a waitress touching his crotch, remarks about eating human flesh, and an alleged comment to one officer that he would “snap her up” if her boyfriend became a violent alcoholic, were found to be inappropriate. Having found that much, the Tribunal then had to ask a further question: whether the inappropriate conduct was serious enough to amount to professional misconduct. Applying the test set out by the Court of Appeal in Dentons UK and Middle East LLP v SRA [2026] EWCA Civ 508, namely “whether the conduct in question would be considered sufficiently serious by competent and reputable solicitors that it be categorised as professional misconduct”, the Tribunal found that it was not. The comments were inappropriate and ill advised, in the Tribunal’s own assessment, but did not cross the threshold of the seriousness needed to breach the Principles or the Code. The Tribunal also rejected a separate argument that the two officers were the solicitor’s colleagues for the purposes of paragraph 1.5 of the Code, finding that a solicitor representing a client in custody could not properly be described as working closely with the police. No order was made as to costs on the basis that the tribunal found that the costs claimed by the solicitor were for lost income and instruction of counsel in relation to a decision by the police to ban him from attending the police station and as such the claim was one of compensation and not costs. The tribunal had no jurisdiction to make such an order.

Competence mapping (SRA Statement of Solicitor Competence)

A dismissal earns its place in this digest because the Tribunal drew a line that the competence framework itself does not draw in the same place. The Statement of Solicitor Competence asks solicitors, at A1a, to recognise ethical issues and exercise effective judgment in addressing them, and at C3a, to treat others with courtesy and respect, not only clients and colleagues. The comments which the Tribunal itself described as inappropriate and ill advised sit uncomfortably with both of those, even though neither amounted to a breach of the Principles or Code that would meet the higher, and separate, threshold for professional misconduct. That gap, between the competence standard and the higher bar the Tribunal applies before it will find professional misconduct, is the real lesson of the case. The SRA does not treat the competence statement as merely aspirational; the SRA’s own guidance says that meeting the competences forms an integral part of the service and competence requirements; the requirements concerning competence are at paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3 of the Code of Conduct. But breach of paragraphs 3.2 or 3.3 was not alleged by the SRA here, and the Tribunal was not asked to measure Mr Davis against the competence statement at all. On the face of it, falling short of the competence standard does not automatically mean falling foul of the SDT, but it is not a distinction a solicitor should want to rely on.

SRA regulatory disposals this week

Eleven SRA outcomes were published during week ending 24 July 2026. Three, were published without enough narrative to comment on; an intervention, a set of conditions tied to an earlier intervention, and one regulatory settlement agreement. The remaining eight fall into four groups.

Four outcomes concern anti money laundering systems, and the pattern from previous weeks continues. Two firms were fined for failing, over periods running from 2017 into 2025 or 2026, to maintain compliant firm wide risk assessments and policies, controls and procedures under the Money Laundering Regulations 2017; two more firms were fined for failing to keep proper records of client and matter risk assessments, in one case across every file reviewed. All four penalties were reduced for early admissions and cooperation, and none records evidence of client harm. In competence terms these are, consistently, A2d, maintaining an adequate and up to date understanding of relevant law, policy and practice; A5a, assessing information to identify key issues and risks, applied to the firm’s own client base; and D3c, applying the rules of professional conduct to accounting and financial matters. Regulation 28 of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 asks a firm to be able to demonstrate its risk assessments, not simply to have carried them out, and the recurring failure this week was demonstration rather than substance.

Two disposals concern dishonesty by staff who are not solicitors and resulted in orders under section 43 of the Solicitors Act 1974. A former paralegal admitted intentionally recording time for work she had not done, then fabricating an email and tampering with screenshots to conceal that from her firm during its investigation. A former senior paralegal in an immigration team forged a client’s and a sponsor’s signatures on Home Office declarations and falsified a language test certificate, then fabricated an email and tampered with screenshots to conceal what she had done from her firm; the client’s immigration application was significantly and detrimentally affected. Neither individual is a solicitor, so the Statement of Solicitor Competence does not apply to them directly, but the firms’ supervisory obligations do; competence C3b, supervising the work of others effectively, and D2, keeping accurate, complete and clear records, describe exactly the safeguards that a system relying on self reported time and unchecked file activity did not have in place; the first came to light through a client’s complaint, although the second was identified through the firm’s own review of her file activity.

One disposal concerns a conflict of interest and its aftermath. A solicitor continued to act for two executors of an estate after their interests diverged over the occupation of a property, then sent one of them a letter that the SRA found went beyond appropriate professional communication and was derogatory and personal in tone. The solicitor was rebuked. Competence A5a, assessing information to identify key issues and risks, covers the point at which a solicitor should recognise a conflict developing between two clients the solicitor still nominally represents; competence C2a, treating clients with courtesy and respect, covers what should have followed once the dispute was live.

One outcome concerns an undertaking. A firm acting for a seller in a conveyancing transaction gave an undertaking to redeem a mortgage on completion without first obtaining or verifying a redemption statement, and the sale proceeds proved insufficient to discharge it in full; the firm met the shortfall from its own funds. It was rebuked. Undertakings are, as the SRA’s decision notes, a fundamental aspect of legal practice, and third parties rely on them precisely because they are expected to be honoured. Competence A1c, identifying and following the relevant rules of professional conduct, covers the obligation itself; competence B7b, assessing and managing risk, covers the verification step that would have prevented the shortfall from arising at all.

Closing thoughts

There were no decisions this week from the barrister side of the profession which is not surprising given the proportion of those practising or working in each area.

Two threads run through this week. The first is that competence and integrity are not always separate failures. In the Ilyas judgment, a case management failure that would, on its own, have remained a straightforward competence matter became a dishonesty finding once the solicitor chose concealment over disclosure when the regulator asked questions. Competence A2b, reflecting on and learning from practice, is easiest to apply the moment something goes wrong, and hardest, and most necessary, once a mistake has already been made and a choice has to be made about what to say next.

The second is the persistence of the anti money laundering theme. Four disposals this week, on top of those already reported in previous editions, describe firms still working through the consequences of the Money Laundering Regulations 2017 many years after they came into force. Competence A2d, maintaining an up to date understanding of relevant law, is not a one off exercise; the firms concerned here have all now brought themselves into compliance, which the reduced penalties reflect, but the years of exposure before that point were avoidable. Compliance with these requirements is not going to get any easier with the forthcoming changes to the regulatory framework.

Where practitioners are dealing with the stress of investigation or tribunal proceedings, LawCare’s free and confidential helpline, 0800 279 6888, remains available to anyone in the legal sector.

And it’s important to emphasise the warning that arises from the Ilyas case on ensuring that both as firms and individual regulated persons, we ensure that supervision is robust and evidenced.

A lesson this week’s decisions teach: competence is not the standard a solicitor sets for themselves, it is what can be evidenced once: a paralegal’s file; the trust a vulnerable client was owed; or a response to a regulator’s question; is measured against the regulatory competence statements.

Beyond Compliance Limited, for information and educational purposes only. This digest does not constitute legal advice.